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Abstract
Traded corporations are required by law to have a majority of outside directors on
their board. This requirement allows the existence of directors who sit on the board of
two or more corporations at the same time, generating what is commonly known as
interlocking directorates. While research has shown that networks of interlocking
directorates facilitate the transmission of information between corporations, little is
known about the extent to which such interlocking networks can explain the
ﬂuctuations of stock price returns. Yet, this is a special concern since the risk of
amplifying stock ﬂuctuations is latent. To answer this question, here we analyze the
board composition, traders’ perception, and stock performance of more than 1,500
US traded corporations from 2007-2011. First, we ﬁnd that the fewer degrees of
separation between two corporations in the interlocking network, the stronger the
temporal correlation between their stock price returns. Second, we ﬁnd that the
centrality of traded corporations in the interlocking network correlates with the
frequency at which ﬁnancial traders talk about such corporations, and this frequency
is in turn proportional to the corresponding traded volume. Third, we show that the
centrality of corporations was negatively associated with their stock performance in
2008, the year of the big ﬁnancial crash. These results suggest that the strategic
decisions made by interlocking directorates are strongly followed by stock analysts
and have the potential to correlate and amplify the movement of stock prices during
ﬁnancial crashes. These results may have relevant implications for scholars, investors,
and regulators.
Keywords: stock market; corporate governance; interlocking networks; information
transmission; ﬁnancial traders
1 Introduction
According to corporate governance standards in the US [], traded corporations are re-
quired to have a minimum of three directors in their board and a majority of outside di-
rectors [, ]. Typically, these outside directors either have their primary aﬃliation with
a diﬀerent corporation, are self-employed, or retired []. This allows a director to sit on
the board of two or more corporations at the same time - including or not their own af-
ﬁliation board, generating what is commonly known as interlocking directorates [–]. In
turn, interlocking networks emerge as the result of many interconnected interlocking di-
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rectorates [, ]. Indeed, interlocking networks have been the focus of numerous research
analyzing their role in the performance of corporations, organizational failure, economic
downturns, hegemony, CEO pay, the sale price of a corporation, stock synchronicity, and
prices for a corporation’s services, among others [, , –]. Yet, the strongest consensus
so far is that interlocking networks mainly favor the transmission of information among
corporations [, , ]. For instance, this information advantage has been observed when
central corporations of interlocking networks can adopt newmarket strategies quicker via
information they gather from their interlocking directorates [, ].
A major question that remains to be answered is whether interlocking networks can
aﬀect market processes []. Board members are typically major stockholders and report
ﬁnancial strategies to their investors [, ]. Indeed, previous work has suggested that in-
terlocking directorates may play an important role in the information gathered by stock
analysts, especially when there is substantial media coverage []. This is a special con-
cern of regulators since the risk of amplifying stock ﬂuctuations is latent [, ]. In fact,
this question has motivated important actions in the US Congress dating back to the early
’s []. Section  of the Clayton Act explicitly prohibited interlocks if the linked corpo-
rations would violate antitrust laws if combined into a single corporation [, ]. Over the
years, these actions have promoted a decrease in the number of interlocking directorates,
especially within the ﬁnancial sector []. However, even with these limitations, it has been
shown that ﬁnancial shocks can be transmitted across the interlocking network regardless
of the degrees of separation between corporations [, , –].
To shed new light on the above question, we study the extent to which interlocking net-
works can explain stock ﬂuctuations. We analyze data on the board composition, traders’
perception, and stock performance of more than , US traded corporations (see the
Appendix for further details). To capture the behavior of interlocking networks across a
variety of ﬁnancial periods, we focus our analysis on the period covered by the big 
ﬁnancial crash and its pre and post ﬁnancial periods.We use the data extracted from Risk-
Metrics [], which is a yearly compilation from - of the board composition of
over , large US traded corporations. Daily closing stock prices for these corporations
are extracted from WRDS database [], and stocks are categorized in a market sector
according to Yahoo Finance criteria []. We analyze traders’ perception on these traded
corporations using trading data and electronic communication among traders from one
US trading ﬁrm for the period - [, ]. Here, we explore the extent to which
interlocking networks can explain stock correlations, the plausible mechanisms linking
interlocking networks and stock markets, and the potential eﬀect of such associations.
2 Results
2.1 Network characterization
We constructed interlocking networks for each year from - formed only by the
traded corporations observed in a particular year. A link between two corporations is es-
tablished if they share at least one board member in the same year. Consistent with previ-
ous studies and regulations [, ], we ﬁnd that the observed boards in these interlocking
networks have a median size of  directors, of which the majority are outside directors
(>%). The % of the observed interlocking directorates (i.e., links between two corpo-
rations) share only one boardmember. In total, there is approximately % of corporations
who do not share any single director with another corporation, whereas the other % are
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on average . interlocking directorates apart from each other. Interestingly, % of all in-
terlocking directorates are formed between corporations that belong to diﬀerent market
sectors, and we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant connectivity diﬀerences across market sectors. These
results are also in agreement with the characterization of interlocking networks found in
previous studies [, ].
Whereas the characterization of the interlocking network remains fairly constant across
the observation period, the ﬁnancial market exhibited important ﬂuctuations from year to
year. In , % of the , observed traded corporations increased their stock price
by the end of the year. In contrast, in , the year of the big ﬁnancial crash, only % of
the , observed traded corporations increased their stock price. This was followed by
a recovery period in  and  were % of , and , observed corporations
increased their stock price, respectively. Finally, in , the market had a relatively bad
period with % of , observed corporations increasing their stock price. Therefore,
these data bring us the opportunity to investigate the association between interlocking
networks and stock ﬂuctuations across diﬀerent ﬁnancial periods.
2.2 Interlocking networks and stock correlations
To studywhether stock correlations can follow a characteristic pattern among interlocking
directorates, we measure the association between network proximity - degrees of separa-
tion - and market similarity - temporal correlation of stock prices - among traded corpo-
rations (Figure ). It was previously shown that the synchronicity between two stocks can
Figure 1 Illustrative example of interlocking directorates. The green and blue traded corporations are
linked by their inside/outside director that sits on their board. The question is whether traded corporations
that are closer in the interlocking network also have a stronger correlation between their stocks.
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increase if these two corporations share a director []. Here, we expand on this question
to ask whether traded corporations that are closer in the interlocking network also have
a stronger correlation between their stocks. For each year, we deﬁne a matrix of network
proximity D of size N ×N , where N is the number of observed traded corporations in a
year, Dij = /(dij), and dij is the degree of separation (number of links) between corpora-
tion i and j in the interlocking network. Note that the degree of separation of a corpora-
tion to itself is dii = , and unconnected corporations have an inﬁnite degree of separation
(dij = ∞). The greater Dij, the higher the proximity between the two corporations in the
interlocking network. Note that our matrix of network proximity takes into account all
pairs of traded corporations.
Additionally, we deﬁne a matrix of market similarity S = M–RRT of size N ×N , where
M is the total number of trading days in a year, and Rik = (zik – 〈zik〉)/σzik is the standard
deviation normalized daily log returns of stock i in day k such that zik = log(pi(k)/pi(k –))
and pi(k) is the closing stock price of corporation i in day k. Therefore, thematrix ofmarket
similarity S corresponds to the correlation matrix R of R []. The higher Sij, the higher
the similarity or temporal correlation of the stock price movements of corporation i and j
in the year.
We calculate partial Mantel correlations [] (both Spearman and Pearson correlations)
between the matrices of network proximity and market similarity while controlling for
other proximity matrices given by market sector, geographic distance, board size, fraction
of directors with ﬁnancial expertise, and average stock price in the year (see the Appendix
for further details). Following previous studies [–], we use the average stock price in
the year as surrogate of ﬁrm size given its relevance and undisputed eﬀect on the analy-
sis of stock ﬂuctuations. We also divide our analysis into the biggest market sectors (Ba-
sic Materials, Consumer Goods, Financial, Health Care, Industrial Goods, Services, and
Technology), where sector matrices are simply sub-matrices of the full proximity matrices
composed of corporations from a single sector.
Importantly, we ﬁnd positive correlations between network proximity and market sim-
ilarity in both individual sectors and in the market as a whole (i.e., taking all sectors to-
gether). Figure  shows that the majority ( out of , P = ., binomial test) of partial
Mantel correlations yield positive correlations with % bootstrap conﬁdence intervals
(solid circles). These correlations hold to additional non-parametric statistical tests (see
Figure 2 Interlocking networks and stock correlations. Spearman partial Mantel correlations (Pearson
correlations yield similar results) between the matrices of network proximity and market similarity of traded
corporations in each year. The red/solid line corresponds to the calculated correlation for all traded
corporations regardless of market sector. Circles correspond to correlations in a particular market sector. Solid
symbols correspond to correlations that do not cross zero using bootstrap 95% conﬁdence intervals (error
bars). We focus on the seven major sectors: (B) basic materials, (C) consumer goods, (F) ﬁnancial, (H)
healthcare, (I) industrial, (S) services, and (T) technology. The Y column in 2008-2011 corresponds to the
correlation between changes in network proximity and changes in market similarity for all pairs of traded
corporations in reference to their values in the previous year.
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the Appendix). While the correlations found have relatively small values (the largest is
.), let us not forget that even small changes in the price of stocks can generate big losses
or gains in the market [, ]. Moreover, these correlation values are larger than the val-
ues generated if we only focus on distances dij =  (see the Appendix), following previous
work []. Interestingly, we can also observe that not all sector behave in the same way.
For instance, the interlocking networks of the healthcare and industrial sectors can explain
more clearly the stock correlations among their constituent traded corporations than the
consumer or ﬁnancial sector. We can also see that some sectors, such as the ﬁnancial or
technological sector, change from negligible (positive) correlations at the beginning of the
observational period to positive (negligible) correlations by the end of the period.We leave
future explanations of these changes to the reader.
To further support the validity of the correlations between network proximity and mar-
ket similarity, we test whether corporations that increase or decrease their network prox-
imity from one year to the next one also increase or decrease their market similarity ac-
cordingly. In speciﬁc, for each year from -, we calculate a newmatrix of network
proximity given by the diﬀerence between the network proximity between two corpo-
rations in a given year Dij(t) and their network proximity in the previous year Dij(t – )
(only taking into account those corporations that are present in both years). Similarly, we
generate a new matrix of market similarity for each year from -, in which the
new elements of each of these matrices are given by the diﬀerence between the market
similarity between two corporations in a given year Sij(t) and their market similarity in
the previous year Sij(t – ). Finally, for each year, we measure the correlation between the
newly generated matrices of network proximity and market similarity.
Figure  (green/Y region) shows that the new correlations between proximity changes
are, in fact, equivalent to the positive correlations in each year. Overall, these ﬁndings re-
veal that changes in the degree of separation between two corporations in the interlocking
network are correlated with changes in their stock correlations. If the degree of separation
decreases, the stock correlation increases, and vice versa.
2.3 Interlocking networks and stock markets
To unveil potential mechanisms explaining the previous association between stock corre-
lations and interlocking networks, we study the behavior of one the main ﬁnancial actors
towards interlocking directorates. In speciﬁc, we analyze the perception and information
gathered by stock analysts on traded corporations and whether this is associated with
their trading activity. As proxy for the information collected by stock analysts, we use
trading data and the electronic communication among a group of ﬁnancial traders from
a US trading company from - (see the Appendix). Previous work has revealed
that traders are constantly tracking business press coverage of traded corporations and
exchanging this information among their peers []. An illustrative example of this infor-
mation concerning corporate directorates is the following message between two traders
on July th : ‘Microsoft willing to enter talks if Yahoo elects new board.’ In fact, it
has been shown that traders’ communications can signal their understanding of market
volatility [, ]. Therefore, this suggests that the more strategic decisions made by in-
terlocking directorates, the higher the chances that there is a media coverage of relevance
to traders, and the higher the potential that this correlates with their trading activity.
To test the above hypothesis, for each year from -, we investigate the associ-
ation of the frequency at which traders talk about traded corporations with the centrality
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Figure 3 Interlocking networks and stock
markets. For each year from 2007-2009, the ﬁgure
shows Spearman rank correlations (Pearson
correlations yield similar results) between tickers’
mentions and the centrality of such corporations in
the interlocking network. Similarly, the ﬁgure shows
Spearman rank correlations (Pearson correlations
yield similar results) between tickers’ mentions and
the traded volume of such corporations by the same
group of traders over the entire year.
in the interlocking network and the traded volume of such corporations. The frequency is
calculated by the total number of times a ticker (e.g. GOOG as for Google) is mentioned
over the entire year by this group of traders. We measure a corporation’s centrality by
〈Di〉 = N–
∑
j Dij, where Dij is the network proximity between two corporations, as men-
tioned above.We ﬁnd that similar results are obtained if we replace 〈Di〉 by other centrality
measures, such as the total number of interlocking directors or the community participa-
tion coeﬃcient []. The traded volume is calculated by the total amount of US dollars
traded by this group of traders over the entire year.
Figure  shows indeed a positive association (partial Spearman rank correlation) of
ticker mentions with both the centrality and traded volume of corporations, controlling
for the average stock price, board size, and fraction of ﬁnancial experts in the board. Inter-
estingly, we ﬁnd negligible associations (partial Spearman rank correlation) between cen-
trality and traded volume, controlling for ticker mentions, the average stock price, board
size, and fraction of ﬁnancial experts in the board. This supports the hypothesis of a path
going from interlocking directorates to traders reacting to information and then to trad-
ing activity. Overall, these ﬁndings show an enhanced attention of stock analysts to central
corporations in interlocking networks.
2.4 Exposure to market ﬂuctuations in interlocking networks
Finally, to test the extent to which interlocking networks can amplify the exposure of
traded corporations to market ﬂuctuations, we compare the centrality of corporations in
the interlocking network with their stock performance over the year. The centrality of a
corporations is again measured by 〈Di〉. Wemeasure a corporation’s short-term and long-
term stock performance by its beta (βi) and its yearly stock price return (ri), respectively.
The commonly known beta of a stock is given by βi = Cov(zi, zb)/Var(zb), where zi and
zb are the daily log returns of stocks i and the benchmark return, respectively (see the
Appendix). The higher (lower) the beta, the more the stock moves in the same (opposite)
direction and farther apart from the benchmark return. This means that during good or
bad market periods, the short-term stock performance of a traded corporation increases
the higher or the lower the beta of the stock, respectively. The yearly stock price return is
given by ri = log(pi(tf )/pi(to)), where pi(to) and pi(tf ) are the daily closing stock prices of
corporation i at the beginning and at the end of the calendar year, respectively. The higher
the yearly return, the better the long-term stock performance of a traded corporation. For
each year from -, wemeasure the eﬀect of centrality on the short-term and long-
term stock performance using a multivariate linear regression model controlling for the
corporations’ individual characteristics (see the Appendix).
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Figure 4 Exposure of traded corporations to market ﬂuctuations. The ﬁrst row corresponds to the scaled
eﬀect of centrality of traded corporations on their short-term stock performance - beta of stocks. The second
row corresponds to the scaled eﬀect of centrality of traded corporations on their long-term stock
performance - yearly log returns of stocks. The red/solid line corresponds to the eﬀect when taking into
account all traded corporations regardless of market sector. Circles correspond to eﬀects in a particular
market sector. Solid symbols correspond to eﬀects that do not cross zero using bootstrap 95% conﬁdence
intervals (error bars). We focus on the seven major sectors: (B) basic materials, (C) consumer goods, (F)
ﬁnancial, (H) healthcare, (I) industrial, (S) services, and (T) technology.
In general, Figure  shows that the centrality of traded corporations has negligible eﬀects
on their long-term and short-term stock performance (but see the Financial sector). This
is in line with our previous ﬁndings showing that interlocking networks favor stock corre-
lations and, in turn, this may explain why interlocking networks have no eﬀect on pushing
traded corporations away from the general market trend. However, Figure  also reveals
that during , the year of the big ﬁnancial crash, there is a negative eﬀect between
centrality and long-term stock performance. These results suggest that during ﬁnancial
crashes, interlocking networks can amplify the exposure of traded corporations to market
ﬂuctuations.
3 Discussion
US governance standards favor the participation of outside directors in corporate boards,
which in turn allows the creation of interlocking directorates. While direct competitors
are prohibited to create interlocking directorates, these corporations have on average only
four degrees of separation. The ﬁnancial sector is a good example of this market envi-
ronment. There is almost no interlocking directorate between ﬁnancial corporations, but
they are indirectly linked by their interlocking directors sitting on the board of a third
corporation belonging to a diﬀerent market sector. Indeed, as we mentioned before, %
of interlocking directorates are formed between corporations belonging to diﬀerent mar-
ket sectors. While interlocking networks facilitate the transmission of information, it has
been unclear whether they can also explain stock ﬂuctuations in the ﬁnancial market.
Our ﬁndings have shown that interlocking directorates seem to be one of the factors fa-
voring the existence of stock correlations.We acknowledge that other confounding factors
can explain stock correlations. Interestingly, a potential mechanism explaining the link
between interlocking networks and stock markets appears to be the enhanced attention
of stock analysts to central corporations. It remains to be seen whether other measures
of centrality can provide better insights about these associations. Importantly, because
interlocking networks may amplify market ﬂuctuations during ﬁnancial crashes, future
work should also explore the impact of the diﬀerent dynamics found across market sec-
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tors. Importantly, it does not escape our notice that these results provide valuable non-
opinionated insight for scholars, regulators, investors, and board members themselves.
Appendix
Board composition data
We use the data extracted from RiskMetrics [], which is a yearly compilation from -
 of the board composition of over , large US traded corporations. We use only
those traded corporation onwhichwe could ﬁnd stock price information in our stock price
data. Board members were manually disambiguated using gender, age, and aﬃliation data
provided by RiskMetrics. These data also have information of whether a board member
is consider a ﬁnancial expert by the traded corporation. In some cases, the same board
member is classiﬁed as a ﬁnancial member in one corporations but a non-ﬁnancial expert
in a second corporation.We decided to classify boardmembers as ﬁnancial experts if they
are considered to be experts at least in one corporation. The board composition and their
ﬁnancial expertise for each year is provided in Additional ﬁle .
Stock price data
Daily closing stock prices from - for these corporations are extracted from
WRDS database [], and stocks are categorized in a market sector according to Yahoo
Finance criteria []. The stock data and market classiﬁcation for each year is provided in
Additional ﬁle .
Traders data
Our data includes the full population of more than  million instant messages sent/re-
ceived and more than  million of trading decisions of day traders at a typical small-to-
medium sized US trading company from -. All trading related data was auto-
matically captured by the company’s trading system, which is specially designed for accu-
racy in recording, and used by most other companies in the industry. The study conforms
to Institutional Review Board (IRB) criteria. There was no subject interaction, all data
was % archival, and the company and the subjects were anonymized. Legally, all data
used in the study is owned by the company. All traders at the company know the company
owns the data and that their communications and trading behavior is recorded by law.We
received written permission from the company to use these data for research purposes
and publishing contingent on identifying characteristics of the company and its traders
remaining conﬁdential and anonymous. For further details see Refs. [, ]. We use only
those tickers that we were able to disambiguate across traders’ communications. Tickers’
mentions and traded volume are normalized (to preserve the company’s conﬁdentiality)
and provided in Additional ﬁle .
Control proximity matrices
Partial Mantel correlations between network proximity and market similarity are con-
trolled by proximity in market sector F, average stock price in the year T, board size B,
fraction of directors with ﬁnancial expertise E, and geographic distance G. The proximity
matrix F corresponds to Fi,j =  if traded corporation i and j belong to the same sector, 
otherwise. In the rest of the control proximitymatrices, the elements (i, j) of thesematrices
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correspond to the inverse of the normalized absolute diﬀerences between the value mea-
sured in corporation i and j, such that higher values always represent corporations with
higher proximity. For proximitymatrixT, Tij = (max{k}–kij)/(max{k}–min{k}) where
kij = |〈log(pi)〉– 〈log(pj)〉| and 〈log(pi)〉 is the average log price of stock i over the year. For
proximity matrix B, Bij = (max{k} – kij)/(max{k} – min{k}) where kij = |bi – bj| and
bi is the total number of board members of traded corporation i over the year. For prox-
imity matrix E, Eij = (max{k} – kij)/(max{k} – min{k}) where kij = |ei – ej| and ei is
the fraction of board members with ﬁnancial expertise of traded corporation i over the
year. For proximity matrix G, Gij = (max{k}– kij)/(max{k}–min{k}) where kij is the
geographic distance between corporation i and j as function of their geographic coordi-
nates latitude and longitude extracted from their zip codes. Zip codes were collected from
Yahoo Finance and fromHighBeam.Com. These data are provided in Additional ﬁle . We
ﬁnd a majority of negligible associations of market similarity with the control proximity
matrices of ﬁrm size, board size, fraction of ﬁnancial experts in the board, and geographic
distance (see Figures S-S in Additional ﬁle ).
Robustness of correlations between network proximity andmarket similarity
We ﬁnd that each of the positive correlations shown in Figure  is also higher than the
expected correlation betweennetwork proximity andmarket similaritywhenwe randomly
generate new matrices of network proximity (see Figure S in Additional ﬁle ). These
newmatrices are generated by bootstrapping elements with replacement from the original
matrices of network proximity. Additionally, the observed correlations between network
proximity andmarket similarity shown in Figure  cannot be reproduced if we disconnect
boards (i.e., dij = ∞) when a certain degree of separation has been exceed (see Figure S
in Additional ﬁle ).
Benchmark return
To calculate the benchmark return, we use the average daily log returns zb = 〈zi〉 of all the
observed corporations. For individual market sectors, we did not ﬁnd statistical diﬀer-
ences if we use 〈zi〉 or the average daily stock returns only of corporations from individual
market sectors. The distribution of betas and yearly stock returns are shown in Figure S
in Additional ﬁle .
Multivariate linear regressionmodel
The model is deﬁned by performancei ∼ 〈Di〉 + 〈log(pi)〉 + bi + fi + i. The response vari-
able performance can take either the beta of the stock βi or the yearly stock return ri. We
control for the average price of the stocks in the year (〈log(pi)〉), the size of the boards (bi),
the fraction of directors with ﬁnancial expertise in each board (fi), and the Gaussian noise
(i). We scale all predictor variables to be able to compare their eﬀect. The model has a
goodness-of-ﬁt of R ∼ . for all years. Interestingly, the control variables board size and
fraction of directors with ﬁnancial expertise show a majority of negligible eﬀects, while
ﬁrm size yields positive and negative eﬀects for short-term and long-term stock perfor-
mance (see Figures S-S in Additional ﬁle ).
Mantel correlation
This correlation is the extension of the standard Pearson or Spearman rank correlation to
dyadic data []. Mantel correlation works as follows, let us assume that we have two sets
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of n objects represented by their similarity matrices Xij and Yij, i.e., dyadic data. For exam-
ple in our case, network proximity and market similarity. The Pearson Mantel correlation
coeﬃcient is computed as
r =
∑
i>j(Xij – X¯)(Yij – Y¯ )
∑
i>j(Xij – X¯)
∑
i>j(Yij – Y¯ )
,
where X¯ = n(n–)
∑
i>j Xij is the average Xij value (similarly for Y¯ ). Note that the sum is
only made on the strictly upper triangular part of the matrices. This is so because similar-
ity matrices are symmetric and have their diagonal elements equal to one. For the Spear-
man rank Mantel correlation, we ﬁrst substitute the elements of the matrices Xij and Yij
by their respective rank. In a similar way we can compute partial Mantel correlations [].
To compute the % conﬁdence interval of the correlation coeﬃcient, we use a bootstrap
procedure []. We re-sample simultaneously the rows and the columns of the similarity
matrices, and then for each re-sampling we compute again the Mantel correlation co-
eﬃcient. The re-sampling procedure results in the empirical distribution of the Mantel
correlation coeﬃcient, from which we extract the % conﬁdence interval.
Additional material
Additional ﬁle 1: Additional data.
Additional ﬁle 2: Additional ﬁgures.
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